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Abstract 
Project managers tasked with delivering safety-critical projects must demonstrate 
care, competence and confidence right from the earliest stages of project inception, when 
levels of uncertainty can be very high. Based on interviews with 30 project management 
practitioners in civil nuclear and aerospace sectors, this paper builds on work by Saunders et 
al. (2015), who posited the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope as a framework for identifying 
uncertainties.   
Our findings are that the six determinants of project uncertainty are similar across 
both civil nuclear and aerospace projects.  The most commonly mentioned determinant of 
project uncertainty was the Environment, followed by Complexity, Capability and 
Information. The impact of Time on project uncertainty and Individual perceptions of 
uncertainty were mentioned less frequently by respondents.  
Our key contribution is to validate the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope over a larger data 
set, thereby enriching our understanding of the sources of project uncertainty in these two 
important and highly-consequential project environments.   
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1. Introduction 
Large scale engineering projects are central to modern society. Without them there 
would be no reliable infrastructure, iconic buildings or inspiring Olympic Stadia.  However, 
one of the myriad challenges facing these projects is how to adequately identify and manage 
project risks, uncertainties and complexities in order to minimise the potential for failure 
(PMI, 2013).  In safety-critical projects - where safety is of paramount importance and where 
the hazards that must be controlled can harm the environment, personnel, or the public 
(Wears, 2012) - the delivery of safe and reliable projects is an absolute imperative. Here 
project objectives such as schedule and cost are always subordinate to the absolute priority 
afforded to safety (Kettunun et al., 2007; Saunders, 2015).  In safety-critical projects 
individuals must bear the burden for projects, whose timescales are often long, budgets vast 
and technical complexity high, and where the consequences of failure may be catastrophic 
(Reiman and Oedewald, 2009).  Irrespective of whether the project is to safely decommission 
nuclear reactors or design the next generation civil airliners, the project landscape will be 
dominated by regulatory requirements and the need to be in control at all times (Hollnagel et 
al., 2006; Laporte and Thomas, 1995). Identifying the sources of, and influences on, 
uncertainty in these safety-critical projects is an essential task for the project management 
practitioner throughout the project lifecycle.   
 Uncertainty in its broadest sense is a state of unknowing – where an individual does 
not have full knowledge of the facts about a particular situation (Perminova et al., 2008).   
Uncertainty pervades our daily lives and has been studied through the lens of several 
academic disciplines from economics, psychology and mathematics to philosophy (see for 
instance Bammer and Smithson, 2009; Osman, 2010).  In the context of projects, the APM 
defines project uncertainty as “a state of incomplete knowledge about a proposition. Usually 
associated with risk, both threats and opportunities” (Association of Project Management, 
  
2006, p. 6).   The extant literature on the management of project uncertainty provides us with 
a number of definitions of project uncertainty, including differentiating it from project risk 
(Grote, 2015; Hillson, 2002; Sanderson, 2012; Chapman and Ward, 2011); discusses how 
uncertainty arises in projects (Atkinson et al., 2006; Cleden, 2009; Martinsuo et al., 2014; Saunders 
et al., 2015; Ward and Chapman, 2003; Winch, 2010) and proffers a variety of approaches to 
managing project uncertainty (Atkinson et al., 2006; Browning, 2014; Cleden, 2009; Hillson, 
2002; Loch et al., 2006; Martinsuo et al., 2014; Perminova et al., 2008; Saunders et al., 2015; 
Vidal, 2015).  
However there are no major studies of uncertainty in safety-critical projects, other 
than a small exploratory study by Saunders et al. (2015).  Given the centrality of safety-
critical industries to modern life, and recent calls in the project management literature to 
replicate rather than reinvent project management research (Horner Reich et al., 2013), our 
aim here is to refine and validate the earlier exploratory study (Saunders et al., 2015) on a 
larger and more purposefully selected data set.  This will enrich our understanding of the 
sources of, and influences on project uncertainty in these highly-consequential project 
environments. 
Our analysis is based on semi-structured interviews with 30 project management 
practitioners on nine large scale projects in civil nuclear and aerospace industries in the 
United Kingdom.  It addresses three key research questions: 
RQ1: Whether and how the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope (the previously posited 
framework for conceptualising the determinants of project uncertainty by Saunders et al., 
2015) will evolve after refinement and validation on a larger study of safety-critical projects? 
RQ2: What are the commonalities in the determinants of uncertainty between civil 
nuclear and civil aerospace sectors and across different project types (new build/new product 
introduction (NPI) versus maintenance projects)? 
  
RQ 3: What are the differences in the determinants of uncertainty between civil 
nuclear and civil aerospace sectors and across different project types (new build/new product 
introduction (NPI) versus maintenance projects)? 
Validating and refining the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope over a much larger data set will 
provide project management practitioners with a framework to identify project uncertainties,  
thereby reducing the emergence of ‘unknowns’ that may delay project implementation, add 
additional costs and reduce stakeholder confidence in the project delivery team.   It is 
important to note that this particular study is limited to the context of safety-critical projects, 
as this is consistent with the earlier exploratory study that we are seeking to validate.  We 
acknowledge that the uncertainty kaleidoscope may have wider application across a range of 
project sectors, but this empirical work lies outside the scope of this paper. 
2. Literature review 
2.1 Uncertainty is a multi-faceted concept  
Uncertainty is a concept that is rich, evocative and loaded with meaning.  Uncertainty 
can conjure up fear and trepidation, or alert one to future opportunities that can be explored, 
depending on the perspective taken. An entrepreneur may look favourably on uncertainties 
within a particular market which he can exploit.  In contrast, a project manager may fear the 
consequences of an uncertain future generated by an organisational restructure. What is clear 
from these two examples is that “uncertainty” is neither a simple nor inconsequential term.  
Instead it is a multi-faceted concept; one that has been studied across a broad range of 
intellectual disciplines.  To the mathematical mind, uncertainty may imply probabilities of 
outcome (Attewell, 2009); to the psychologist the debate centres on the extent to which 
uncertainty is an objective or subjective phenomenon (Head, 1967; Kahnemann and Tversky, 
1982; March and Simon, 1958), and to the business executive the presence of future 
  
uncertainties underlies most strategic decisions (cf. Harrison, 1992; Porter, 1980; Sutcliffe 
and Zaheer, 1998).  
Within the domain of project management a number of scholars have articulated the 
possible sources of uncertainties in projects.  Complexity arising from product requirements, 
the technology choices made or the variety of actors involved in the project is one such 
source of uncertainty (Cleden 2009; Martinsuo et al., 2014; Winch, 2010).  Weick (1995) lists 
information load (the volume of ambiguous information that must be processed) and 
turbulence (the rate at which project facts change and the randomness of their timing and 
direction of change) as two further sources of uncertainty.  Uncertainty may also arise due to 
factors in the external environment, for example, institutional decision making processes, or  
from external market or competitor actions (Aaltonen, 2011; Winch, 2010). A final source of 
project uncertainty arises at an individual level: for example, different personality types may 
view uncertainty very differently (Madsen and Pries-Heje, 2009), with uncertainty being seen 
as a subjective phenomenon ( Head, 1967; Perminova et al., 2008).  
Chapman and Ward (2011) argue that uncertainty arises through each of 7W’s of 
projects (who the various parties involved are, what they wish to achieve, what the shape of 
the final project deliverable is, how the project delivery mechanism is set up, what key 
resources are required to execute the plans, when do the key project events have to take place 
and finally where will the project take place).  Other scholars categorise the sources of 
uncertainty; for example into environmental, organisational, technical and resources 
(Colarelli O’Connor and Rice, 2013); into stakeholders, external context, organisational 
context and management processes (Lechler et al., 2014)  or in terms of the inherent 
properties of a project (complexity, complicatedness, dynamism and interconnectedness) 
(Ramesh and Browning, 2014).  Chapman and Ward (2011) acknowledge that many of these 
  
sources are not independent of one another, and that their interaction with one another can 
lead to sizeable impacts on projects.   
 
2.2 Introducing the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope 
Following a review of the literature on uncertainty and a small exploratory empirical 
study, Saunders et al. (2015) categorised the sources of uncertainty in the particular context 
of safety-critical projects.  These are the complexity of the project, the environment in which 
it is being delivered, the capability of both the project team and the wider supply chain, 
temporal issues such as the timescales and speed of the project, the availability of 
information and individual team member perceptions of uncertainty.  Each of these six 
determinants of project uncertainty can be further broken down into a number of different 
components.  For example, environmental uncertainty may emerge through external factors 
such as political, market or competitor activity or may arise as a result of organisational 
culture, specific norms of behavioural or decision making processes. Information uncertainty 
is similarly subdivided into an absence of information, lack of knowledge, inadequate 
understanding of cause and effect relationships, poor estimating ability and lack of clarity of 
project objectives.   Many of the components of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope are also 
interrelated, for instance the number and diversity of actors on a project impacts both its 
complexity and also the environmental uncertainty through the range of stakeholder demands 
that the project may face.  Both these components will shape the overall level of uncertainty 
on the project.  Saunders et al. (2015) synthesised these various sources of uncertainty into 
the “Uncertainty Kaleidoscope” – see Figure 1 below.   
INSERT FIGURE 1 
The Uncertainty Kaleidoscope evolved from a systematic review of the literature on 
project uncertainty and interviews (n=8) with project management practitioners in both civil 
  
nuclear and civil aerospace industries (Saunders et al., 2015).  Topics in normal text in Figure 
1 were reported in the literature and topics in italics emerged during the eight interviews.  
The framework is in the form of a kaleidoscope as a metaphor for understanding project 
uncertainty.  It reflects a key similarity between large scale projects and the eponymous 
children’s toy; in that a kaleidoscope can generate a multiplicity, perhaps even an infinite 
number of distinct landscapes of project uncertainty from the same six determinants – 
complexity, environment, capability, time, information and individual.  New uncertainties 
may also emerge as the project progresses.  This is equivalent to the kaleidoscope being 
shaken, which may lead to the emergence of a very different project landscape.  For example, 
the ‘as built’ drawings of a nuclear reactor may be insufficiently accurate to prevent major 
new uncertainties emerging during the project to decommission the site and return it to a 
clean state.   Conversely a gas turbine engine on the engine test-bed may deliver test data that 
does not fit the theoretical models by which the engine has been designed.  Many months of 
work and large additional expenditures may be necessary to correct the engine design and 
allow it to be certified to fly.  These sudden changes in project landscape, often small but on 
occasion highly consequential, can affect the likelihood of the project objectives being 
achieved, or may even lead to new project objectives being necessary.   Finally, it is 
important to note that the utility of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope does not lie in its predictive 
power, but as a visual framework to enable project practitioners in safety-critical 
environments to discuss and debate where uncertainty may reside in projects, before it causes 
unwelcome surprises within the project team. 
The key limitation of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope, as presented in Figure 1, is that it 
had only been tested on a small sample of project management practitioners.  In order to 
refine and validate the Kaleidoscope, it was necessary to extend the earlier exploratory study 
to a much larger number of project management practitioners employed on a wider range of 
  
safety-critical projects in both civil nuclear and civil aerospace sectors.  This was the primary 
purpose of the study reported on here.   
Given the diverse range of projects undertaken in these highly consequential settings, 
we also wanted to establish whether there were common sources of uncertainty between the 
sectors and also between different project types, which would require us to tailor the 
Uncertainty Kaleidoscope for a particular project context.   
3. Methodology  
The methods we used here are consistent with those described in the smaller scale study 
reported in Saunders et al., 2015, as our aim was to refine and validate the Uncertainty 
Kaleidoscope against a larger dataset.  Thus we adopted a qualitative approach, comprising 
semi-structured interviews with 30 project management practitioners involved in nine large-
scale safety-critical projects in the UK.  Only one of the nine projects (new nuclear power 
plant - CN4) had formed part of the previous small-scale study.  The projects were 
purposefully chosen to represent both civil nuclear and civil aerospace sectors (there were 
five nuclear and four aerospace projects drawn from six different organisations) and to reflect 
two major types of project –“new build/new product introduction projects” and “maintenance 
projects”. For example, new build/NPI projects in the study ranged from the development of 
the next generation gas turbine engine to the building of new nuclear power plants and test 
facilities. Maintenance projects included the decommissioning and clean-up of the former 
sites of nuclear power stations, solving technical challenges in existing reactors to extend 
their safe operating life and retrofitting safety-critical aircraft assemblies to reduce their 
maintenance requirements or increase efficiency.  The projects were all being delivered by 
large private sector organisations, and were selected based on their fit with the two project 
types above and their accessibility to the authors.  The projects ranged in value from 
£25Million to upwards of £10Billion, and each was at different stages of their lifecycle from 
  
initial design to testing and commissioning.  Selecting two different project types and two 
distinct industry sectors enabled us to identify any differences between the determinants of 
uncertainty between sectors and across project types, thereby improving the potential 
usefulness of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope to the project management community.  
The 30 interviews were undertaken face-to-face at the project sites between March and 
September 2014. Between two and four respondents per project were interviewed, in order to 
minimise individual respondent bias and to allow more valid cross-project comparisons to be 
undertaken. Selection of respondents was by intensity sampling, which is a type of purposeful 
sampling that selects respondents who are experts about a particular experience (Morse, 
1984).  All respondents held key project roles such as Programme Manager, Subproject 
Manager, Project Technical Lead or Commercial Manager.  A complete list of the projects 
and the respondents is provided in Table 1 below. All specific project data has been 
anonymised due to the confidentiality restrictions in these organisations.   
INSERT TABLE 1 
During the interviews respondents were asked to provide demographic information, 
and then to give an overview of the project and their role in it.  Respondents were 
intentionally not shown the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope either before or during the interviews.  
Instead respondents were asked “What are the determinants of project uncertainty in this 
particular project, where determinant means the sources of, and influences on, project 
uncertainty?”  This part of the interviews lasted between 25 and 35minutes.  Later in the 
interviews respondents were questioned about how they manage project uncertainty but this 
analysis is outside the scope of this paper.  All interviews except one were audio-recorded 
and later transcribed (one respondent did not allow the use of the voice recorder and written 
notes from the interview, approved by the respondent, were used).  
  
The transcribed interviews were analysed using content analysis, which is a technique 
“where the researcher interrogates the data for constructs and ideas that have been decided in 
advance” (Easterby-Smith et al., 2008, p173).  In content analysis, a set of categories are 
established – in this case from the earlier Uncertainty Kaleidoscope (Saunders et al., 2015) 
and the number of instances of each category counted.  The a priori identification and 
systematic counting of these specific categories in the interview transcripts allows inferences 
to be made from this set of data (Stone et al., 1966). In this study, one ‘count’ was recorded if 
a respondent mentioned a particular category of project uncertainty: irrespective of the 
number of times that the category was mentioned within the same interview.   
Validity and reliability in content analysis is directly impacted by the level of inter-
coder reliability – the consistency of agreement between two or more coders.  Consistent with 
Evans (1996) and Neuendorf (2002) this study used one main coder, with a second coder 
undertaking a reliability check on the coding counts and categories. During this corroboration 
process one new category emerged – that of client capability. This new category was added to 
the analytical categories and the number of ‘counts’ checked again by the main coder.  
During the analysis process a small number of other new components of uncertainty emerged 
that had not previously been identified during the earlier exploratory study.  These were also 
added to the analytical categories, and the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope revised to take account 
of them.  The findings of this study should be generalisable to other safety-critical projects in 
the civil nuclear and civil aerospace sectors, given that the sample (nine safety-critical 
projects) is sufficiently large and varied to be representative of projects in these sectors. 
4. Results 
The findings of this study are structured around the three research questions. First, the 
content analysis of the 30 interviews is presented and its implications for the validity and 
  
refinement of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope discussed.  Secondly, commonalities in the 
determinants of uncertainty across civil nuclear and civil aerospace sectors are identified. 
Thirdly, any differences between the two sectors are reported and a final section highlights 
any commonalities and differences between the two selected project types.  
4.1 RQ1: Validation and refinement of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope 
The interview data set which formed the basis for the content analysis comprised 18 
interviews with civil nuclear project management practitioners and 12 interviews with civil 
aerospace project management practitioners.  This imbalance between civil nuclear and 
aerospace data was not intentional but rather a manifestation of the difficulty in gaining 
researcher access to these commercially sensitive project environments.  The categories and 
counts for the content analysis are provided in Table 2. In order to compare the two sectors 
directly the number of counts is expressed in terms of number of counts per total number of 
interviews in that sector.   
INSERT TABLE 2  
All the analytical categories are drawn from the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope shown in 
Figure 1, with the exception of integration issues (uncertainties in how the constituent parts 
of the project design would come together), clarity of roles and responsibilities, project 
funding, site security (uncertainties in contractors gaining access to secure sites), project 
scope clarity and client capability which were raised by respondents during the interviews 
and were added to the list of categories. The emergence of these new categories did not 
materially impact the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope as they fitted into the existing six top level 
determinants of uncertainty – for example integration issues contribute to Complexity, whilst 
funding and site security were classified as Environmental determinants of uncertainty.  Data 
  
saturation (Guest et al., 2006) was observed in this study, with no new categories being raised 
after Interview 22. 
The results of the content analysis were compared with the earlier version of the 
Uncertainty Kaleidoscope (depicted in Figure 1), enabling it to be both refined and validated.   
The refined model is shown in Figure 2 below.   
INSERT FIGURE 2 
The refined Uncertainty Kaleidoscope illustrates the 6 determinants of project 
uncertainty.  Each determinant comprises a number of more specific and detailed sub-
components.  There are a small number of differences in nomenclature between the earlier 
and refined version of the model; with Temporal renamed as Time, and Environmental 
renamed Environment.  The components of Individual and Information remain unchanged but 
additional components have been added to Capability (client capability), Complexity 
(integration issues), Time (changes in scope, information and priorities) and Environment 
(project funding and clarity of roles and responsibilities).   
4.2 RQ2: Commonalities in the determinants of uncertainty between civil nuclear and 
aerospace sectors  
Figure 3 demonstrates that the six key determinants of project uncertainty (Complexity, 
Time, Environment, Capability, Individual and Information) are very similar across both civil 
nuclear and civil aerospace sectors.  The most commonly mentioned determinant of project 
uncertainty is the Environment, followed by Complexity, Capability and Information.  The 
impact of Time on project uncertainty and Individual perceptions of uncertainty were 
mentioned much less frequently by respondents.   
INSERT FIGURE 3  
  
Figures 4 -9 increase the granularity of analysis to the specific sub-components of 
uncertainty.  At this level of detail, we see that four of the determinants remain broadly 
similar across the two industry sectors (Complexity, Information, Time and Individual) and 
two highlight important differences (Environment and Capability).   
INSERT FIGURE 4 
 
In both civil nuclear and aerospace the complexity (see Figure 4) of the functional 
requirements of the product (for example, the range of nuclear materials that a test facility 
had to be able to characterise), was the most oft-mentioned determinant of project 
uncertainty.  This was followed by the diversity of actors and stakeholders (ranging from the 
project team, the wider technical community, to regulators) many of whom were able to 
mandate changes in scope, or project requirements or delivery timescales for the project.  
This uncertainty is exemplified by this quotation from CA2  
“Approvals have to go through our initial customer, so we go through them and then it 
goes all the way up to the engine manufacturer and then the air-framer and the airline 
operators – this is a big uncertainty.”  
 Other less often mentioned subcomponents were technical novelty (when and how to 
implement new technologies within the project) and the impact of inherent system instability, 
emergent properties and issues of how to integrate different component parts of complex, 
highly interconnected engineering systems. Uncertainties in integration were not raised in the 
earlier study, but were highlighted by seven respondents in this study, as exemplified here: 
“The challenge on this project is an order of magnitude greater in terms of integration. It’s 
very congested buildings, very close working, lots of difficult access problems and I foresee 
  
integration of all the work that needs to be done as a mammoth challenge for us. So I think 
there is a huge level of uncertainty around that” Programme Manager CN4. 
INSERT FIGURE 5 
Figure 5 depicts the similarity between civil nuclear and aerospace sectors in terms of 
Information as a determinant of project uncertainty.  The overwhelming majority of 
Information uncertainty arose from missing or incomplete information or a lack of knowledge 
or understanding.  In the nuclear sector missing information included poor past record 
keeping over what materials were stored where, and a lack of ‘as built’ drawings of old 
facilities, as evidenced on CN1 here: 
 “We have uncertainty around the waste we are going to put in the containers. That’s 
because the source facilities at [X] from which the waste is being removed have a chequered 
past and the record keeping and continuity of knowledge hasn’t been maintained.” 
   In addition, many nuclear subsystems, for example the performance of graphite bricks 
under seismic load, was chaotic, scattered and extremely dynamic, making it hard to 
understand the causes of differences between modelled and experimental test results, and 
impacting on the preparation of essential safety cases.  In civil aerospace projects, 
Information uncertainty often concerned an inability to frame the problem correctly, to 
understand the input parameters or to develop sufficient confidence in a new engine through 
analytical modelling before an expensive test engine was subjected to the rigours of the 
engine test bed. 
INSERT FIGURE 6 
 
The similarity in shape of both polar diagrams in Figure 6 also indicates broad 
agreement across both sectors as to the role of Time as a determinant of project uncertainty.  
  
In both civil nuclear and aerospace projects the greatest contributor to temporal uncertainty is 
project turbulence, which manifests itself as changes in project scope, objectives and priority.  
Projects delivering safety-critical aircraft subsystems reported continual uncertainty over both 
scope and schedule as captured succinctly here on CA2: 
“We are constantly uncertain about when we’re going to start and when the [sub-
system] qualification will be complete.  We are constantly uncertain about scope – is it going 
to change?”  
A nuclear decommissioning project (CN5) also faced repeated changes in project 
scope, requirements and permitted methods of working which delayed the project and 
damaged client-contractor relationships: 
 “so when you thought you had something and you are delivering it, they [the client 
engineers] would change the scope, impose a new set of requirements in terms of documents, 
or the method of working would no longer be acceptable” Project Manager CN5   
Less frequently mentioned contributors to Time uncertainty were the lifecycle stage of 
the project and the speed and timescale of the overall project although several respondents 
acknowledged that uncertainties are typically highest at the inception phase of projects and 
gradually reduce as the project evolves, as argued previously by Atkinson et al.(2006) and 
Cleden (2009).  
INSERT FIGURE 7 
One intriguing finding in this study was the lack of discussion of Individual uncertainty 
in either sector. Only three civil nuclear respondents and one civil aerospace respondent 
discussed uncertainty in terms of a state of mind that exists as a response to external triggers. 
The following quotation from CA3  is indicative in this regard: “You have to live with this 
  
uncertainty [over manufacturing lead times], while still being able to put a plan together 
which shows you can deliver a part on a particular date.  So you have to guess at this stage 
and that does make me feel a bit uncomfortable and vulnerable”  
Furthermore, there was only one mention of uncertainty that exists in the mind of the 
one who doubts (from the same civil aerospace respondent).  Most respondents in this study 
across both sectors viewed uncertainty as residing ‘out there’ in the external world, rather 
than arising from individual and subjective differences in how uncertainty is perceived.   
4.3 RQ3: Differences in the determinants of uncertainty between civil nuclear and 
aerospace sectors  
Figures 8-9 illustrate a number of key differences between the two sectors in terms of 
the subcomponents of two of the six determinants of uncertainty – Environment and 
Capability.  
INSERT FIGURE 8 
The Environment (Figure 8) was the most often mentioned source of uncertainty in 
projects in both sectors.  In the civil nuclear industry, respondents described multi-
organisational project environments, replete with diverse organisational cultures, where the 
‘ways of doing things round here’ had yet to be established in the project.  The primary 
challenge facing civil nuclear project managers was not the complexity or novelty of the 
technical solution, but rather contending with external influences on the project, within a 
complex emergent organisational setting and satisfying the myriad internal and external 
stakeholders, many of whom held a metaphorical axe over the project and its continuing 
existence.  This uncertainty was expressed on CN2:  
  
“So technically you may think you have the answer but is it politically acceptable. 
Stakeholder management is a big part of what I have to do.” 
In civil aerospace, environmental uncertainty was most often caused by external 
market factors, such as global aviation demand, oil prices, industry responses to serious 
incidents such as the loss of Flights MH370 and MH17 in 2014 (The Guardian, 2014), and 
changes in requirements or cost pressures from the airline operators and aircraft 
manufacturers alike. This uncertainty was expressed on all the civil aerospace projects; most 
notably on CA1:  
“Market uncertainty is there too. We will generally have sunk a lot of money into a 
project before we get a customer, so we have lots of business plans.  Some over deliver and 
some under deliver. The market forecast is impossible to predict.”  
In civil aerospace projects, Environmental uncertainty also arose from a lack of role 
clarity within organisations that were frequently being restructured and re-engineered in the 
pursuit of cost savings and greater organisational efficiency. For example the Deputy 
Programme Executive on CA3 reported that  
“The organizational set up has changed quite a lot recently, and people are struggling 
to adjust to that and therefore it is not always obvious who the right people to talk to are.”   
These organisational realignments were a major source of uncertainty for project 
management practitioners, both in terms of their own careers and in terms of keeping the 
project on track.  Lastly, securing project funding was an ever present source of uncertainty 
in both civil nuclear and aerospace industries, with project managers often unable to recruit 
staff due to ongoing funding uncertainties. A lack of funding was used as an excuse for 
  
inaction at the planning stages of projects, followed by an inevitable rush to deliver the 
project once funding sanction was given.    
INSERT FIGURE 9 
Figure 9 shows further marked differences between the sources of uncertainty around 
Capability across the two industry sectors.  For example, in the civil nuclear sector the 
majority of the uncertainty emanates from a lack of capability within a long and often 
fragmented supply chain, as articulated on CN1:  
“Another uncertainty is supply chain and resources – there has been a lack of 
investment and attention in the nuclear supply chain and it has withered on the vine.”  
Lack of attention to the nuclear skills base in the UK (Cogent, 2009) has caused the 
nuclear supply chain to degrade, leading to big resource challenges for nuclear projects that 
require nuclear-grade capability from external suppliers.   Respondents described a dangerous 
assumption that was still prevalent within nuclear projects; that there was an unlimited pool 
of external skilled resources ready and willing to bid for any project work.  
This contrasted sharply with the civil aerospace sector, where one of the major areas of 
uncertainty was securing internal resources, particularly in specific technical disciplines such 
as design.  Civil aerospace project managers often did not control their resources leaving 
them vulnerable to other project priorities, or even to other projects outbidding them for key 
staff.  A good example of this was shared on CA1: 
“just when we think we are okay [Project T] might blow up on the test rig and resources 
are taken from our project – entire groups of people are just taken off the project…….You 
can’t negotiate priorities – you say I have got a timeline to keep, they say I have got to keep 
people in the air and it trumps everything. So priorities from other projects kill you” 
  
4.4. Commonalities and differences in the determinants of uncertainty between new 
build/NPI projects and maintenance projects 
A comparable analysis of component uncertainties, broken down by project type and 
industry sector is not presented here as the numbers of projects in each category are too small 
to make this analysis a meaningful one.  Instead, the analysis focuses on the six determinants 
of uncertainty and their comparison across different project types.  Figure 10 shows the 
determinants of uncertainty across the two different types of project that were studied (new 
build/NPI vs maintenance).  
INSERT FIGURE 10 
 Comparing Figures 3 and 10, we see that the differences between project types are 
greater than the differences between the two industry sectors.  New build/NPI projects 
reported higher counts of the Environment, Time and Complexity determinants of uncertainty 
than maintenance projects. The higher reported counts of Environment uncertainty were 
primarily caused by greater stakeholder and political influences within the large-scale and 
often high profile civil nuclear new build projects.  Similarly, the higher counts of Time as a 
determinant of uncertainty were also strongly influenced by the lifecycle stage of the nuclear 
new build projects.   Finally, possible explanations for the greater counts of Complexity in 
new build/NPI projects in both sectors were the increased demand for novel technological 
solutions in new build/NPI projects in contrast to the more incremental solutions that were 
pursued in maintenance projects. This in turn created typically more complex functional 
requirements that had to be met in new build/ NPI projects.    
Figure 11 compares the six determinants of uncertainty across both different project 
types and the two industry sectors.  It shows that the differences between civil-nuclear new 
build/NPI and maintenance projects are greater than the differences between those seen 
  
between civil aerospace new build/NPI and maintenance projects.  The civil nuclear new 
build/NPI projects remain exposed to high levels of Environmental and Time uncertainty in 
comparison with civil nuclear maintenance projects, whereas the differences between civil 
aerospace new build/NPI and maintenance projects are less pronounced – with the polar 
diagrams following a similar shape.  The only exception to this is the difference in Individual 
perception of uncertainty, but this difference is very small, and arises due to the mention of 
individual perception by two respondents on civil aerospace maintenance projects. 
  5. Discussion 
This study has drawn further attention to the dimensions of uncertainty within the 
specific context of the safety-critical project and how it varies between sectors and across 
different project types.  The findings refine and validate earlier work by Saunders et al. 
(2015) over a much larger and purposively selected data-set of nine case study projects across 
both civil nuclear and aerospace sectors.  In this discussion section we interpret the outcomes 
of the study, comparing our findings with other research on the sources of project uncertainty 
and the earlier posited framework of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope.  This section is again 
structured around the three research questions. 
5.1 RQ1: Validation and refinement of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope 
Earlier exploratory research (Saunders et al., 2015) posited the Uncertainty 
Kaleidoscope as a highly visual framework for mapping project uncertainties in safety-
critical projects.  Our larger scale study analysed 30 respondent interviews, also from safety-
critical projects, allowing us to refine and validate the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope as a model 
for mapping the determinants of project uncertainty in safety-critical projects.  Importantly 
we have also identified which of the six determinants are most prevalent in safety-critical 
projects; our findings showed that the Environment was the most often mentioned 
  
determinant of project uncertainty, followed by Complexity, Capability then Information.  
The impact of Time on project uncertainty and Individual perceptions of uncertainty were 
highlighted much less frequently.   The Uncertainty Kaleidoscope builds on earlier efforts (by 
Colarelli O’Connor and Rice, 2013; Lechler et al., 2014; Martinsuo et al., 2014 and Ramesh 
and Browning, 2014) to categorise the sources of uncertainty in different project contexts.  It 
is however the first framework to be developed for the specific context of the safety-critical 
project and the first to rank the prevalence of the different sources of uncertainty. Validating 
the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope is an important contribution to research, as safety-critical 
projects do exhibit nuances and tensions that may not manifest themselves in other less 
highly consequential environments.  Two such tensions are the ever present trade-off between 
profitability and safety (Reiman and Rollenhagen, 2012), and the tension between the 
provision of redundancy versus the risk of increasing the complexity of the system (Ripjma, 
1997).  Somewhat paradoxically additional redundancy may challenge safe operation as it 
adds additional complexity to a system, makes systems less transparent, and can give a false 
sense of security in safety margins (Kettunun et al., 2007).  Consequently, the technology 
solutions adopted by safety-critical projects are often complex and always subject to 
extensive regulatory requirements (Hollnagel et al., 2006; La Porte and Thomas, 1995).  As 
stated earlier, ultra-safe design and operation is the key aim of all safety-critical projects 
(Amalberti, 2001).  However this overarching focus on safety can lead to extensive 
procedures and regulations, the use of conservative and often aging technology and often 
rigid and bureaucratic hierarchies of control (Kettunun et al., 2007).  These unique 
characteristics of safety-critical projects perhaps explain the high prevalence of Environment 
and Complexity uncertainty in our study.   
As already acknowledged, the utility of Uncertainty Kaleidoscope lies not in its 
predictive power, but as a validated model to help project practitioners visualise the myriad 
  
landscapes of project uncertainty that may arise in safety-critical projects and better identify 
and assess where areas of uncertainty may reside.   Like many metaphor based models it is 
intended to be memorable and to act as a visual tool, enabling productive discussion and 
debate about the sources of uncertainty at each stage of a project’s lifecycle.   Like all 
metaphors it has limitations and the authors acknowledge the weaknesses inherent in using a 
kaleidoscope as a metaphor for projects.   After all the very purpose of a kaleidoscope is to be 
shaken to make new patterns, in contrast to projects, which in an ideal world would remain 
stable and not subject to violent perturbation.   
In spite of this limitation, we argue that using the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope to 
explicitly identify, characterise and debate uncertainty may increase project managers’ 
confidence in addressing the uncertainties with which they are confronted.  As a minimum it 
should enable areas of uncertainty to be identified and explored, rather than ignored or 
overlooked (Lechler et al., 2014).  As an added benefit it may also lead to a gradual change in 
perspective from uncertainty as risky, problematic and something to be feared, to 
uncertainties as potential opportunities, from which the project may exploit and profit as 
argued by Hillson (2004), Olsson, (2007) and Schlesinger et al. (2012).  
5.2 RQ2: Commonalities in the determinants of uncertainty between civil nuclear and 
aerospace sectors 
This study has demonstrated that the six determinants of project uncertainty 
(Complexity, Time, Environment, Capability, Individual and Information) are broadly similar 
across both civil nuclear and civil aerospace sectors.  At the more detailed sub-component 
level of project uncertainty we found that the components of Complexity, Information, Time 
and Individual sources of uncertainty were similar across the two sectors and for the most 
part consistent with other research studies.  For example, our findings on Complexity support 
  
earlier work by Danilovic and Sandkull (2005) and Reyman et al. (2008) that the Complexity 
determinant of uncertainty is strongly influenced by uncertainty in the functional 
requirements of the project and the wide diversity of actors in stakeholders in these multi-
organisational, high-profile projects.  Consistent with earlier work by Harrison (1992) and 
Cleden (2009), we also found that the majority of Information uncertainty arose from missing 
or incomplete information or a lack of knowledge or understanding. The main area of 
dissonance with earlier research was the lack of mentions of Individual perceptions of 
uncertainty in this study; which contrasts with a strong theme in the literature (cf. Head, 
1967; Kahnemann and Tversky, 1982; Madsen and Pries-Heje, 2009; Perminova et al., 2008). 
One possible explanation for this could be the engineering backgrounds of many project 
managers within these sectors, and a culture which focuses on pragmatic problem solving and 
project delivery rather than agonising over whether uncertainties exist ‘out there’ or ‘in the 
mind’. Or, it may be that even if project managers are uncertain and unsure, these doubts are 
internalised and not articulated by individuals who are trained to undertake formal analyses to 
gain certainty over complicated technical problems (Vidal, 2015).  An alternative, although 
untested, hypothesis could also be that large-scale safety-critical projects tend to attract 
individuals who are comfortable dealing with high levels of uncertainty. Nevertheless, in-
spite of the lack of empirical evidence for individual uncertainty we have retained the 
Individual determinant and its subcomponents within the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope as 
uncertainty as a subjective phenomenon is such a dominant theme in the academic literature. 
The close similarity between many of the sources of uncertainty in civil nuclear and 
civil aerospace projects is not entirely surprising given the fact that both sectors must deliver 
complex, large scale engineering projects to demanding safety and performance standards, 
under the spotlight of powerful and proactive regulatory authorities (La Porte and Thomas, 
1995; Saunders, 2015).  However one key question, that remains unanswered, is whether the 
  
ways in which these uncertainties emerge, are assessed and acted upon are also similar across 
both civil nuclear and aerospace sectors, or whether there are ways of contending with 
uncertainty that are unique to each sector.   
One further observation from the data in Table 2 is the relatively low number of 
mentions of each subcomponent of uncertainty across all respondents. For example even the 
most common sub-components of uncertainty were only mentioned by half the respondents. 
This heterogeneity in individual perceptions of the sources of uncertainty actually provides 
further empirical evidence for the broad and multi-faceted nature of uncertainty, at least in 
the safety-critical context.   Project uncertainty can manifest itself in myriad ways and arise 
from a diverse range of sources, even within a single determinant.  This serves as further 
evidence of the utility of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope as an empirically tested and highly 
visual framework to encourage project managers to discuss and debate early on where 
uncertainty may reside, rather than ignoring or hiding from it.  
5.3 RQ3: Differences in the determinants of uncertainty between civil nuclear and 
aerospace sectors and between project types 
This study identified more pronounced differences between civil nuclear and civil 
aerospace sectors at the finer granularity of the components of uncertainty that make up each 
determinant.  In particular, the Environment and Capability as sources of project uncertainty 
each manifest themselves in different ways in the two industry sectors studied.  For example 
Environment uncertainty is more likely to arise due to myriad internal and external 
stakeholders in nuclear but is caused more by external market and competitive pressures in 
civil aerospace.  And Capability uncertainty pervades the entire nuclear project supply chain 
whereas it is more focused on internal resource availability in civil aerospace.  Both these 
differences can be explained by the different structural and competitive landscapes in the two 
industry sectors in the United Kingdom.  For example the civil aerospace sector operates 
  
under immense commercial and cost pressure from airline operators (Lofquist, 2014).  Here 
actions by competitors or new customer demands can cause significant impacts to product 
development pipelines and available budgets.  There is also an established and well-resourced 
supply chain for civil aerospace projects (Jackson, 2004), meaning that capability issues are 
more tightly focused on the host project organisation.  In contrast, the civil nuclear industry 
suffers more acutely from political pressure and differing public perceptions of the 
desirability of nuclear power (Kettunun et al., 2007). As a consequence, civil nuclear projects 
are exposed to a more diverse group of stakeholders and host project organisations are more 
likely to subcontract much of the project design and delivery work to 3rd party organisations. 
This increases the Capability uncertainty in the supply chain which may be simultaneously 
bidding for multiple decommissioning or maintenance projects as well as ramping up 
resources to start work on the next generation of nuclear power plants. 
 We also found evidence of differences in the determinants of project uncertainty 
between project types, with civil nuclear new build/NPI projects exhibiting higher levels of 
Environmental and Time uncertainty than civil nuclear maintenance projects.  It is difficult to 
draw generalisable conclusions from this finding, due to the diversity of projects studied from 
nuclear decommissioning and site clean-up work to the design and build of new nuclear 
power generation capability. All of the projects studied were also at very different stages in 
the lifecycle, from inception to final implementation.  However our findings do support 
earlier research by Atkinson et al. (2006) and Winch (2010) that uncertainty will generally 
reduce as a function of project progress.  A more extensive research study, comparing larger 
numbers of different project types which are at similar stages of the project lifecycle is now  
required to provide more robust evidence of any significant differences in the determinants of 
uncertainty across different project types. 
6. Conclusions 
  
Gaining research access to safety-critical projects can be difficult due to the high levels 
of commercial sensitivity that prevail in these industries.  This study of nine safety-critical 
projects provided a valuable opportunity to explore these under researched project 
environments, and has enabled us to make three important contributions to literature and 
practice. First, we have responded to Horner Reich et al.’s (2013) call for researchers to 
replicate rather than reinvent project management research by validating the Uncertainty 
Kaleidoscope as a model for mapping the determinants of project uncertainty in safety-
critical projects.  Secondly, we have demonstrated that the six major determinants of project 
uncertainty (Complexity, Time, Environment, Capability, Individual and Information) are 
broadly similar across both civil nuclear and civil aerospace sectors.  Thirdly, we also 
identified which of the six determinants are most prevalent in safety-critical projects 
(Environment, followed by Complexity, Capability and Information). 
The project management practitioners tasked with managing these complex, large-scale 
safety-critical projects in civil nuclear and civil aerospace industries have to operate with 
care, competence and confidence in an environment of high uncertainty.  Using the 
Uncertainty Kaleidoscope to identify the sources of and influences on uncertainty may help 
these individuals better structure their projects for success and render them less likely to be 
surprised by ‘unknowns’ that may delay project implementation, add additional costs and 
reduce stakeholder confidence in the project delivery team.  By identifying areas of 
uncertainty early on in the project lifecycle, when the scope may be very fluid, costs and 
timescales little more than unsubstantiated estimates, and the required trade-offs between 
competing project objectives just beginning to emerge, it may also be possible to reorient 
project managers’ perceptions of project uncertainty as unwanted, negative and bound up 
with risks to project delivery, into a more expansive, optimistic understanding of uncertainty 
  
as an opportunity to be exploited with positive approaches for changing how projects are 
delivered (as argued by Lechler et al., 2014).   
6.1 Limitations and areas for future work 
There are a number of limitations in the research which need to be highlighted.  First, 
the access to projects was to some extent opportunistic. Although strenuous attempts were 
made to identify a well-balanced portfolio of projects to investigate, access was not always 
granted within a reasonable timeframe, resulting in an imbalance in interviews between civil 
nuclear and aerospace projects.  Secondly, the interviews provided a snapshot of the sources 
of uncertainty in the projects; and therefore failed to measure any dynamic properties of the 
uncertainties and how they might change over the course of a project’s lifecycle. Thirdly, 
although the authors interviewed several respondents per project to minimise individual 
respondent bias, it was not possible to further triangulate the findings by accessing other 
sources of data, for example project documentation or participant observation.   
Three important areas for future research have also been identified.  The first of these 
would be to investigate the wider applicability of the Uncertainty Kaleidoscope by testing its 
utility, both in other safety-critical sectors, such as oil and gas and across a broader range of 
project environments. The second area for future research would be to further quantify the six 
determinants of uncertainty (and their components); ranking them in terms of impact on 
safety-critical projects, thereby enabling project managers to focus on the areas of uncertainty 
with the most material impact on project delivery. Thirdly, given the close similarity in the 
sources of uncertainty across the two sectors, another important avenue of further research 
would be to explore whether these uncertainties are identified, assessed and acted upon in a 
similar manner across civil nuclear and aerospace sectors, or whether there are ways of 
contending with uncertainty that are unique to each sector. 
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Figure 1: The Uncertainty Kaleidoscope (from Saunders et al., 2015) 
  
Project 
Objectives
Complexity
Size of project
Product Requirements
Diversity of actors
Technology choices
Nature of supply chain
Environmental
PESTLE influences
Stakeholder demands
Market and Industry
Institutional norms & 
decision making
Regulatory framework
Individual
Psychological profile
Internal state of mind
Bounded rationality
Fallacy of rational 
decision making
Information
Lack of information,
knowledge, understanding
of  cause and effect relationships
Estimating ability
Clarity of project objectives
Temporal
Life cycle stage
Project tempo  & 
timescale
Turbulence
Organisational 
priority of 
project
Capability
Skills/expertise of 
project team
Project management 
maturity of 
organisation
Resource availability at 
project and industry 
level
Supply chain capability
  
Project Description Code Industry Sector Project Type Respondent Roles 
Intermediate level 
waste (ILW) storage 
facility 
CN1 Civil Nuclear maintenance Project Engineering Manager 
Project Director 
Project Controller 
Commercial Manager 
Reactor life-extension 
project 
CN2 Civil Nuclear maintenance Group Head of Project 
Technical Lead 
Sub-project Manager 
Sub-project Manager 
Development of new 
civil nuclear test 
facilities 
CN3 Civil Nuclear new build/new 
product introduction 
Senior Project Manager 
Project Manager 
Risk Analyst 
Nuclear new build 
project 
CN4 Civil Nuclear new build/new 
product introduction 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Programme Manager 
Decommissioning of 
specific elements of 
nuclear power station 
CN5 Civil Nuclear maintenance Project Manager 
Commercial Manager 
Client account director 
Development of new 
gas turbine engine 
CA1 Civil Aerospace new build/new 
product introduction 
Subsystem Programme Manager 
Subsystem Programme Manager 
Deputy Programme Executive 
Retrofit of safety-
critical assemblies to 
in-service aircraft 
CA2 Civil Aerospace maintenance In service Programme manager 
Operations Shift Manager 
Project Team Leader 
Phased upgrades to in-
service aircraft 
CA3 Civil Aerospace maintenance Deputy Programme Executive 
Chief of Subsystem 
Integrated Project team Leader 
Integrated Project team Leader 
Development of new 
test facility 
CA4 Civil Aerospace new build/new 
product introduction 
Programme Manager 
Project Manager 
 
Table 1: The projects, their type and list of respondents 
  
  
 
Determinant Components of uncertainty 
Civil Nuclear 
(Number of 
counts/numbe
r of 
interviews) 
Civil 
Aerospace 
(Number of 
counts/numb
er of 
interviews) 
Total number of 
counts/total 
number of 
interviews 
across both 
sectors 
Complexity 
Functional requirements of the 
product 
0.5 0.4 0.5 
  Diversity of actors and stakeholders 0.3 0.3 0.3 
  
Inherent project complexity (including 
Feedback loops, instability and 
emergent system properties/ 
integration issues) 
0.3 0.2 0.2 
  Technical novelty 0.4 0.3 0.4 
Information  Incomplete and imperfect information 0.5 0.5 0.5 
  Lack of knowledge or understanding 0.5 0.5 0.5 
  
Incomplete understanding of cause 
and effect relationships  
0.1 0.0 0.1 
  Inability to estimate accurately 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Environmental 
Environmental turbulence (due to 
changes in market, political 
environment or competitor activity) 
0.4 0.7 0.5 
  
Competing and conflicting 
stakeholder demands 
0.4 0.3 0.4 
  
Culture (organizational tolerance of 
uncertainty, Institutional decision 
making processes, clarity of roles and 
responsibilities) 
0.4 0.6 0.5 
  Regulatory constraints 0.2 0.0 0.1 
  Site security 0.2 0.0 0.1 
  Funding 0.3 0.2 0.3 
Time Stage of project lifecycle 0.2 0.3 0.2 
  Project tempo and timescale 0.2 0.1 0.1 
  
Project turbulence (rate of change of 
project facts, direction of change, 
clarity of scope) 
0.4  0.3 0.4 
Individual  
Uncertain state of mind due to 
external triggers 
0.2 0.1 0.1 
  
Uncertainty exists “in the mind of the 
person who doubts” 
0.0 0.1 0.0 
  
Bounded rationality and Fallacy of 
rational decision making 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
  
Different psychological profiles 
perceive uncertainty in different ways 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
Capability Skills and experience of project team 0.2 0.1 0.2 
  
Project management maturity of 
organisation 
0.3 0.2 0.2 
  Internal resource availability 0.3 0.5 0.4 
  
Capability (skills and experience 
across industry supply chain) 
0.4 0.3 0.4 
  Client capability 0.2 0.1 0.1 
Table 2: Categories and number of counts/number of interviews (there were 18 civil nuclear 
and 12 civil aerospace interviews) 
  
 
Figure 2: Refined and validated model of the “Uncertainty Kaleidoscope”. Components 
in italics arose from the empirical studies; those in normal text from the literature. 
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system/emergent 
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Organisational culture (norms, 
decision making, roles and 
responsibilities)
Individual
Psychological profile
Internal state of mind
Bounded rationality
Fallacy of rational 
decision making
Information
Lack of information,
knowledge, understanding
of  cause and effect 
relationships
Estimating ability
Time
Life cycle stage of 
project
Tempo  & timescale
Turbulence (rate and 
direction of changes 
in scope, 
information, 
priorities)
Capability
Skills/expertise of project 
team
Project management 
maturity of organisation
Resource availability at 
project and industry level
Supply chain capability
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Figure 3: Number of counts per total number of interviews for each of six determinants of 
uncertainty 
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Figure 4: Components of Complexity as a determinant of project uncertainty: Total 
number of counts per total number of interviews in each sector. 
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Figure 5: Components of Information as a determinant of project uncertainty: Total 
number of counts per total number of interviews in each sector. 
  
  
 
Figure 6: Components of Time as a determinant of project uncertainty: Total number of 
counts per total number of interviews in each sector. 
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Figure 7: Components of Individual as a determinant of project uncertainty: Total 
number of counts per total number of interviews in each sector. 
  
  
 
 
Figure 8: Components of Environment as a determinant of project uncertainty: Total 
number of counts per total number of interviews in each sector. 
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Figure 9: Components of Capability as a determinant of project uncertainty: Total 
number of counts per total number of interviews in each sector.  
  
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
Skills and 
experience 
of PM team
PM maturity 
of 
organisation
Internal 
resource 
availability
Supply chain 
capability
Client 
capability
Total civil nuclear 
counts per total 
number of 
interviews
Total civil aerospace 
counts per total 
number of 
interviews
  
 
Figure 10: Number of counts per total number of interviews in new build/NPI projects and 
maintenance projects for each of the six determinants of uncertainty.  
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Figure 11: Number of counts per total number of interviews for each of the six determinants 
of uncertainty differentiated by both project type and industry sector 
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